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Abstract
The efficiency of unilateral climate policies may be hampered by carbon leakage
and competitiveness losses. A widely discussed policy option to reduce leakage
and protect competitiveness of heavy industries is to impose border carbon
adjustments (BCAs). The estimation of carbon leakage as well as the assessment
of different policy options led to a substantial body of literature in energy-
economic modeling.
In order to give a quantitative overview on the most recent research of the
topic, we conduct a meta-analysis on 25 studies, altogether providing 310 esti-
mates of carbon leakage ratio according to different assumptions and models.
The typical range of carbon leakage estimates are from 5% to 25% (mean 14%)
without policy and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCAs.
A meta-regression analysis is performed to further investigate the impact
of different assumptions on the leakage estimates. The decrease of the leakage
ratio with the size of the coalition is confirmed and quantified. Among the
BCAs options, the extension of BCAs to all sectors and the inclusion of export
rebates are the most efficient features in the meta-regression model to reduce
the leakage ratio. All other parameters being constant, BCAs reduce leakage
ratio by 6 percentage points.
1. Introduction
International climate agreements are likely to remain subglobal in the years
to come: the global climate architecture is shifting from a UNFCCC-led top-
down regime to a bottom-up approach (Rayner, 2010). Differences in abatement
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targets among countries may lead to two distinct but interrelated issues: carbon
leakage and competitiveness losses, especially among Energy Intensive Trade
Exposed (EITE) sectors, such as cement, steel or aluminium (Dröge, 2009).
Indeed, the asymmetry of carbon costs between regions may induce a shift
of production of carbon intensive products from carbon-constrained countries
to less carbon-constrained countries. As carbon dioxyde is a global pollutant,
i.e. the geographic location of emissions has no influence on its environmental
impacts, this carbon leakage would reduce the environmental effectiveness of the
climate policies. Moreover, these production losses in heavy industries would
also damage the economy and involve job destructions.
Carbon leakage and competitiveness issues have been one of the main ar-
guments against the implementation of ambitious climate policies. A growing
body of academic literature has been developed in the recent years to quantify
the impacts of uneven climate policies and to find the best policy measures
to counteract them. Among them, border carbon adjustments (BCAs), which
consist in taxing products at the border on their carbon content, are widely dis-
cussed. Their consistency with the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well
as their political consequences remain highly contentious among legal experts:
they could constitute an incentive to join the climate coalition or trigger a trade
war because of green protectionism suspicions.
Ex post econometrical studies have not revealed so far any evidence of car-
bon leakage (Reinaud, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011; Sartor, 2013)
predicted in analytical models (Fischer and Fox, 2012; Jakob et al., 2013; Hoel,
1996; Markusen, 1975). Ex ante modeling are dominated by computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) models (Böhringer et al., 2012a) but there are also some
sectoral partial equilibrium models (Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; Monjon and
Quirion, 2011b). Some literature reviews have been published recently on the
subject (Branger and Quirion, 2013; Zhang, 2012; Quirion, 2010; Dröge, 2009;
Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007) but to our knowledge no quantitative meta-analysis
has been conducted on this topic.
Meta-analysis is a method developed to provide a summary of empirical re-
sults from different studies and test hypotheses regarding the determinants of
these estimates (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). It has been extensively used in
medical research. The first meta-analysis in economics can be traced back to
Stanley and Jarrell (1989). In the field of environmental and resource economics,
the majority of meta-analyses summarizes the results of different nonmarket val-
uation studies (Van Houtven et al., 2007; Brander and Koetse, 2011; Barrio and
Loureiro, 2010; Ojea and Loureiro, 2011; Richardson and Loomis, 2009). Closer
to our subject, one can cite two studies on marginal abatement costs to mitigate
climate change, one for all sectors (Kuik et al., 2009) and the other specific to
agriculture (Vermont and De Cara, 2010). An extensive review of meta-analysis
methods in environmental economics is given in Nelson and Kennedy (Nelson
and Kennedy, 2009).
In this article, we conduct a meta-analysis on 25 studies dating from 2004 to
2012, altogether providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage ratios according to
different assumptions and models. The typical range of carbon leakage estimates
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is from 5% to 25% (mean 14%) without policy and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%)
with BCAs. We conduct a meta-regression analysis to further investigate the
impact of different assumptions on carbon leakage estimates. Impact of key
model parameters, such as Armington elasticities, and policy features such as
linking carbon markets or extending pricing to all greenhouse gases sources
can be highlighted. We find that, all other parameters being constant, BCAs
implementation reduces the leakage ratio by 6 percentage points.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follow. Section 2 describes the
database and section 3 provides some descriptive statistics. The meta-regression
model is explained in section 4 and results are discussed in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. Database description
Many articles and working papers deal with carbon leakage and competitive-
ness issues but only some of them are models giving ex ante numerical estimates.
The body of literature regarding these issues also comprises ex post econometri-
cal analyses, analytical models and political or juridical studies (Cosbey et al.,
2012; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b). The first criterion
to be part of our sample was to provide numerical estimations of carbon leak-
age with a model. The second criterion was, since the purpose of this paper is
to investigate the impact of border carbon adjustments on leakage, to include
BCAs in the scenarios. Thirdly, we discarded old studies (before 2004) to focus
on the recent literature.
To constitute our sample, we searched for studies in standard search engines
(Web of Science, Google Scholar) and cross references with keywords “carbon
leakage” and “border carbon adjustments”. The research was completed in De-
cember 2012. Our sample is made of 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012, most
of them (14) are part of the recent Energy Economics Special Issue. Some are
grey literature (MIT working paper, World Bank working paper, etc), others are
published in energy economics and environmental economics journals (Energy
Economics, Energy Policy, the Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Climate Policy
etc). The majority are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models which
rely on the GTAP database (except for one), the others are sectoral or multi-
sectoral partial equilibrium models. The number of carbon leakage estimates
per study varies from 2 (Weitzel et al., 2012) to 54 (Alexeeva-Talebi et al.,
2012a), with a mean of 12.6.
The studied effect-size in the meta-regression analysis is the leakage-to-
reduction ratio or leakage ratio,
l = 4ENonCOA−4ECOA
where 4ECOA is the emissions variation in the climate coalition between the
climate policy scenario and the counterfactual business-as-usual scenario, and
4EnonCOA the emissions variation in the rest of the world. Its common use
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Figure 1: Leakage ratio in selected studies (mean, minimum and maximal values with or
without BCAs), ranked by mean value without BCAs
Figure 2: Leakage ratio reduction in case of Border Carbon Adjustment (same ranking as in
figure 1)
avoids us to make approximate conversions between studies. In other words all
studies calculate the same thing, which is necessary in a meta-analysis as a ”syn-
thesis requires the ability to define a common concept to be measured”(Smith
and Pattanayak, 2002)).
In the majority of the cases results were available on tables, but sometimes
they were taken from graphs or derived from own calculation like in Mattoo
et al. (2009).
3. Descriptive Statistics
3.1. First sight
Figure 1 presents ranges of leakage ratio estimates for the 25 studies (mean,
minimum and maximal values with or without BCAs). Leakage ratio estimates
range from 2% to 41% without BCAs and from -41% to 27% with BCAs. Eight
studies find negative values of leakage ratio in case of BCAs, with three studies
(Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; McKibbin et al., 2008; Lanzi et al., 2012) find-
ing values below -15%. Internal variations (within one study) of leakage ratio
estimates range from almost null (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b) to relatively
high (Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Ghosh et al.,
2012) depending on the scenarios and models.
Comparing scenarios by pair (with and without BCAs, all the other pa-
rameters being constant), we can observe that in all cases, BCAs led to a
reduction of the leakage ratio1. These results are in contrast with (Jakob
et al., 2013) who found that BCAs could increase the leakage ratio2. For each
pair, we calculate the leakage ratio reduction in percentage points (defined as
LeakageRatioReduction = LeakageRatioNoBCAs − LeakageRatioBCAs ). In
the majority of the cases, the leakage ratio reduction due to BCAs stands be-
tween 1 and 15 percentage points, but there are some outliers above 30 percent-
age points, where BCAs actually generates negative leakage ratios (McKibbin
et al., 2008; Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004).
1In figure 1, for FF2012 (Fischer and Fox, 2012), the mean with BCAs is higher than with
no BCAs, but the “equivalent” BCAs scenarios corresponds to the highest value of leakage
ratio of the no BCAs scenario (Europe only abating).
2In this paper, under certain conditions, if in non-coalition countries, the carbon intensity of
exports (“clean” sector) is higher than those of local production (“dirty” sector), a reallocation
of production induced by BCAs from “clean” to “dirty” sector would increase emissions in
non-coalition countries and then leakage ratio on a global scale
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Apart from carbon leakage, competitiveness losses in energy-intensive in-
dustries constitutes the other component of the climate trade nexus. Though
extensively used in the public debate, the notion of competitiveness remains am-
biguous (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b). Some authors consider that this notion
is meaningless at the national level (Krugman, 1994). At the sectoral level, it
may refer to “ability to sell” or “ability to earn”. In CGE models, competitive-
ness is most of the time implicitly defined as “ability to sell” and measured by
gross output. In our sample, 17 of the 25 studies show results of output change
for industries. Based on GTAP sectors, EITE sectors often regroups refined
goods, chemical products, non-metallic minerals, iron and steel industry and
non-ferrous metals (although sometimes refined goods is aside). Some studies
present only disaggregated results by sectors, and not the output change for
EITE sectors as a whole. In this case, we use the average of the output of iron
and steel and non-metallic minerals sectors (or average of cement and iron and
steel) as a proxy for EITE sectors3.
The output change of EITE sectors varies from -0.1% to -16% without BCAs
and from +2.2% to -15.5% with BCAs. There is a clear dichotomy between
CGE models where output loss range is 0%-3% (except for Alexeeva-Talebi
2012 (b) and Ghosh et al. 2012 where it is a bit more (around 3%-7%)) and
sectoral partial equilibrium models where output loss range is 8%-15%. In all
cases, BCAs reduce the output loss among EITE industries4 and in five cases
(Peterson and Schleich, 2007; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b; Kuik and Hofkes,
2010; Mattoo et al., 2009; Ghosh et al., 2012), the output variation of EITE
industries is even positive.
The welfare (or in some studies GDP) variation of the abating coalition
ranges from -1.58% to 0.02% without BCAs and from -0.9% to 0.40% with
BCAs (the environmental impact is never taken into account in the welfare es-
timation5). Though BCAs improve welfare of coalition countries compared to a
no BCAs scenario, they most of the time do not reestablish a “neutral” situation
(e.g a variation near 0%). The welfare variation is still negative after BCAs,
because the consumers of the coalition pay higher prices in EITE sectors’ prod-
ucts. This improvement of welfare in coalition countries goes hand in hand with
a degradation of welfare in non-coalition countries. BCAs have big distribution-
nal impacts: they transfer a part of the burden to the non-coalition countries
(Böhringer et al., 2012c). In the studies that report it (Böhringer et al., 2012c;
Lanzi et al., 2012; Mattoo et al., 2009), global welfare is decreasing with BCAs.
3For the only two studies where output changes were available both by sector and for EITE
sectors as a whole (Lanzi et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012), it was a correct proxy. Iron and
Steel (resp. Non-Metallic Minerals) being a bit less (resp. more) impacted than EITE as a
whole
4However in the CASE model (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a,b), cement output is more
reduced in the presence of BCAs
5In the Energy Economics special issue, leakage is endogenously compensated by a higher
abatement to assure a same environmental impact in all scenarios in order to compare welfare
variations
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Figure 3: Output change of EITE industries in selected studies (ranked by mean value without
BCAs)
Figure 4: Welfare variation in abating coalition (ranked by mean value without BCAs)
3.2. Merging studies
Gathering all the estimates of carbon leakage in the 25 studies, we compute
kernel density estimations for the estimates accross all studies. As the number
of estimates varies greatly (from 2 to 54) across studies, we consider two ways
of merging results, the “scenarios equality” method and the “articles equality”
method. In the “scenarios equality” method, we add all estimates regardless
of the article they are from. Then an article with N estimates “weights” N/2
times more in the final distribution than an article with only two estimates. In
the “articles equality” method however, weights are put on estimates to assure
that each article “weights” the same in the final distribution6. By this process
the distribution of results with the “articles equality” method is less smooth
because there are artificially some accumulation in the distribution. However the
distributions share the same shape with both results, especially for the leakage
ratio and the output variation of EITE industries, which can be interpreted as
a sign of the robustness of the results.
Both leakage ratio distribution and EITE output change distribution are
bimodal. For leakage ratio without BCAs there is a concentration around 5%
and another around 12%7. We can see that a leakage ratio above 100%, theo-
retically possible if the carbon content of products is higher outside the climate
coalition is well out of the range of estimates in the literature. For EITE output
variation there is a concentration at -2% and another one (more spread out) at
-7%, which can be interpreted as the dichotomy between CGE models and PE
models. The coalition welfare variation distribution is unimodal, with a mode
of -0.6% without BCAs and -0.3% with BCAs.
One can easily visualize in figures 6 and 7 the impact of BCAs in reducing the
leakage ratio, restoring some competitiveness and to a lesser extent improving
coalition welfare with the left shift of the leakage ratio distribution and the right
shifts of output change and coalition welfare change distributions.
6If Nk is the number of estimates in the article k, the weight for an estimate from article i
is then maxk(Nk)
Ni
(and the closest integer value for kernel estimate using Stata). In this case
each article weights maxk(Nk) in the final distribution.
7Not a single estimate of leakage ratio is negative without BCAs, the negative part is an
artifact in the kernel density estimation
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Figure 5: Leakage ratio (Kernel density estimates)
Figure 6: Output change of EITE industries (Kernel density estimates)
4. Meta-regression analysis
4.1. Methods
Meta-regression is widely used in meta-analysis as it is an interesting way
to go beyond standard literature review, by combining numerical results from
different studies in a statistical manner (Vermont and De Cara, 2010; Kuik
et al., 2009; Horváthová, 2010). Guidelines on how meta-regression analysis of
economics research should be conducted were recently published (Stanley et al.,
2013). The guidelines were divided into three topics: research questions and
effect size; research literature searching, compilation and coding; and meta-
regression modeling issues.
The first topic is discussed in the introduction (general context of the re-
search question and statement of the effect studied) and in the end of part 2
(how the effect size is measured by the leakage ratio, which is a common metric).
The second topic is discussed in the beginning of part 2 (how the literature was
searched and what are the criteria for study inclusion). Table 1 gives detailed
information on the articles used in the meta-analysis. Stanley et al. (2013) en-
courage that two or more reviewers should code the relevant research. In this
study, only the first author searched and coded the research literature.
In the rest of this part, we will detail the third topic (modeling issues). As
recommended as good practice, we display descriptive statistics of the variables
that are coded (see Table 7 in the appendix for the effect size e.g. the leakage
ratio, and Table 2 for the regression variables). Publication bias is a major
issue in meta-regression analysis. This form of sample selection bias occurs if
primary studies with statistically weak or unusual results are less likely to be
published (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). For example, it has been widely rec-
ognized to exaggerate the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (Doucouliagos and
Stanley, 2009). Statistical techniques to take this bias into account exist (Stan-
ley, 2005; Rothstein et al., 2006; Havranek, 2013) but they require standard
errors of the estimates. We cannot apply these methods here since we deal with
numerical studies (no statistical significancy is involved and then no standard
errors are given with the results). It is highly likely that a publication bias
also exists in the area of modeling studies: authors compare their results with
those of the literature and are able to change the settings or calibration of their
models to influence the results. Our best option to address this issue was to
embrace as many studies as possible without artificially setting aside some of
them, e.g. non peer-reviewed papers.
Another potential issue is the existence and the treatment of outlier ob-
servations (some estimates that are unrepresentative or overly influential). To
discard outliers we first perform a robust estimation procedure using iteratively
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Figure 7: Welfare variation (Kernel density estimates)
Figure 8: BCAs leakage reduction (in percentage points)
Huber weights8 (Huber, 1964) and only keep estimates whose final weights are
above a certain threshold (5%). Among the first original samples of 310, 144
and 166 values (for “All”, “no BCAs” and “BCAs”, see later), 16, 10 and 6
observations were dismissed (20 out of 25 articles have less than one discarded
estimate). The fact that the articles with the more discarded estimates were
the relatively old ones (Mathiesen and Maestad (2004), Babiker (2005) and Pe-
terson and Schleich (2007)) suggests that the literature is converging (which
could also reflect a publication bias...). Estimation of parameters without the
treatment of outliers is given in the appendix as a sensitivity analysis. The
reader can verify that the exclusion of outliers slightly improves the statistical
significance of some coefficients without substantially affecting the results of the
meta-regression analysis.
Finally, heteroskedasticity in effect size variance and non-independence of
observations of the same primary studies due to within study dependence has
long been recognized as a potential estimation problem for meta-regression (Nel-
son and Kennedy, 2009). Some authors favor the use of a “best-set” of estimates,
meaning a single estimate per study (Stanley, 2001) but this shrinks dramati-
cally the pool of estimates. In our case we used a Random Effect Multi-Level
(REML) model with study identifiers as in Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009),
to control for the potential dependence of estimates within a primary study.
A second method, a “cluster-robust” OLS estimator9, as in Kuik et al. (2009)
and Vermont and De Cara (2010)), is used as a sensitivity analysis (see ap-
pendix). Some differences on the coefficient values exist but overall our findings
are robust to the method employed.
4.2. The model
To investigate the sources of heterogeneity among the different carbon leak-
age estimates, we test three variations of the meta-regression model based on
different samples: one for all leakage ratio estimates, one for estimates in the
absence of BCAs and the last one for estimates in the presence of BCAs:
Leakageij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij + β4Linkij
+β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij + β7BCAsij + uij
8The Stata command that is used is rreg
9The observations are gathered in 15 clusters (see Table 1). Studies with many observations
are the first clusters (with the exception of Monjon and Quirion (2011a) and Monjon and
Quirion (2011b) which are merged because results are from the same model CASE II), then
studies that share common features are gathered in same clusters (2 or 3 studies per cluster
representing 10-15 observations).
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LeakageNoBCAs,ij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij + β4Linkij
β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij + uij
LeakageBCAs,ij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij + β4Linkij
+β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij + β8Expij + β9Foreignij
β10AllSectij + β11Indirectij + uij
where Leakageij is the i-th estimate of leakage ratio reported in the j-th study.
The choices of the variables in the models are driven by the scenarios and
the available data in the studies, as well as the debates in the literature. The
first variables are GE (a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the model is a CGE),
Coasize (the size of the abating coalition in percentage of worldwide emis-
sions10) and Abatement (the abatement target)11. Then we have two dummies
related to scenarios Link (if permit trading is authorized between the different
regions of the coalition12) and GHG (if all carbon sources, and not only CO2
are considered).
Armington elasticities, which are used to model international trade, are con-
sidered as a crucial parameter in leakage ratio estimates (Monjon and Quirion,
2011a; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012a; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). Most
of the time they were not explicitly displayed in the articles. However some
studies made sensitivity analyses on this parameter (for example doubling or
dividing in half the original values). In the meta-analysis, the Armington pa-
rameter is then, rather than a numerical value, an “almost dummy” linked with
“high” (+1), “low” (-1), “very high” (+2) or “very low” (-2) Armington elas-
ticities values13 when sensitivity analysis were performed on these parameters.
It would have been interesting to incorporate a parameter for the fossil fuel
supply elasticity which is also recognized to be determinant in the leakage ratio
estimations for the international fossil fuel channel (Light et al., 1999; Gerlagh
and Kuik, 2007). However, because they were not available most of the time, it
was decided not to take them into account in the meta-regression.
BCAs is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if BCAs are implemented.
It is the central parameter of our study since we primarily investigate to what
extent BCAs are efficient to reduce leakage. Four dummies detail the policy
10In the overwhelming majority of the articles, the coalitions were centered on Europe, in
several cases enlarge to Annex 1 except Russia (A1xR) or A1xR plus China. Therefore no
variable was considered to describe the coalition in itself (for example EU or US), but only
its size in terms of worlwide emissions.
11The logarithm of Coasize and Abatement have been tried as variables without changing
the statistical significancy of the results
12which supposes that the abating coalition is composed of more than one region in the
model. For example if Europe is the abating coalition it is not considered that permit trading
is allowed
13In Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) the Melitz structure (Melitz, 2003) is considered equiv-
alent to “very high” Armington
10
features of the BCAs: Exp (if export rebates are part of the scheme), Foreign
(if the adjustment is based on foreign specific emissions, instead of home specific
emissions or best available technology), AllSect (if the adjustment concerns all
sectors and not only EITE sectors), and Indirect (if indirect emissions are
taken into account in the adjustment). Table 2 summarizes information about
the regression variables.
5. Discussion of the results
Interpreting the results, one must bear in mind that, though meta-regression
analysis is a powerful tool to incorporate all the sources of variability in a single
model, one must interpret the results with caution. Indeed, the calculated co-
efficients depend not only on primary models, that made different assumptions,
but also on the statistical variability of the parameters which is, except for the
variable BCAs, far from being perfect. For example, Abatement is set at 20%
for 61% of the cases and varies within three studies only (Böhringer et al., 2012a;
McKibbin et al., 2008; Demailly and Quirion, 2008). Indirect is set at the value
1 for 91% of the cases and varies within two studies only (Böhringer et al., 2012c;
Monjon and Quirion, 2011b). This aspect is unavoidable in a meta-regression
analysis as we take already made studies and do not design the scenarios by
ourselves. We still include these “poorly variable” variables in the regression,
and interpret the coefficients in the light of this aspect, knowing that they may
be biased or may not appear as statistically significant as they may have been.
The results of the meta-regresssion are visible Table 3. We recall that three
estimations are performed: one for all the leakage ratio estimates, one for those
in the absence of BCAs and one for those in the presence of BCAs. The quality
of the estimations is assessed through the Wald χ2 test and the LR (Likelihood
Ratio) test that compares the results with the linear regression. The presence
of within-study dependence is revealed by the Durbin-Watson test (computed
after a simple OLS estimation), and the LR test confirms that the use of a
REML estimation is appropriate.
The difference between CGE models and other models is statistically signif-
icant and is positive (except for the “no BCAs” sample). We find that, all other
parameters being constant, the leakage ratio estimate is 9 percentage points
higher in CGE models and 12 percentage points in the case of BCAs implemen-
tation, which is a noteworthy difference. The lack of non-CGE models estimates
(non CGE models constitute only one fifth of the articles and even less in terms
of leakage ratio estimates) remains an impediment for the statistical value of this
coefficient. An explanation could be that CGE models include both channels
of leakage ratio, the competitiveness channel and the international fossil fuel
channel, which is recognized to predominate (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007; Fischer
and Fox, 2012; Weitzel et al., 2012) whereas partial equilibrium models only
include the first one (except for Mathiesen and Maestad (2004)).
The coefficient for the coalition size is negative and very statistically signifi-
cant. Changing the size of the coalition from Europe (15% of world’s emissions
in 2004) to Annex 1 plus China except Russia (71% of world’s emissions in 2004)
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Table 3: Meta-regression results. REML estimation
All No BCAs BCAs
GE 0.091 0.047 0.124
(2.74)*** (1.60) (4.27)***
Coasize -0.214 -0.221 -0.147
(12.12)*** (10.97)*** (5.94)***
Abatement 0.090 0.163 0.084
(1.04) (1.78)* (0.69)
Link 0.003 -0.005 0.002
(0.26) (0.48) (0.13)
GHG -0.029 -0.014 -0.062
(2.24)** (1.04) (2.82)***
Armington 0.019 0.033 0.003
(4.68)*** (7.75)*** (0.51)
BCA -0.063
(14.27)***
Exp -0.039
(2.98)***
Foreign -0.020
(1.90)*
Allsect -0.042
(2.90)***
Indirect -0.015
(0.87)
N 294 134 160
Wald χ2 386.13† 192.61† 78.25†
LR test 220.50† 96.95† 42.02†
DW test OLS 0.68 0.52 1.08
† prob = 0.0000
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would involve in the model a decrease of leakage ratio of about 12 percentage
points without BCAs and 8 percentage points with BCAs.
Theoretically, the bigger is the abatement, the higher is the leakage in ab-
solute terms (tons of carbon emissions). As the leakage ratio is the leakage
in absolute terms divided by the abatement and the latter increases as well,
there is an indeterminacy about the relationship between the abatement and
the leakage ratio. In the meta-regression model, the correlation is positive, but
the statistical significancy is weak (a p-value below 0.1 is reached only for the
no-BCAs sample), which may be attributable to the small variability of this
parameter. In Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2012b) (which was not included in our
study because there was no BCAs), the correlation is negative (leakage of 32%,
29% and 27% for Europe abating respectively 10%, 20% and 30% of its emis-
sions). In Böhringer et al. (2012b) however, the relationship is positive (leakage
of 15.3%, 17.9% and 21% for Europe abating respectively 10%, 20% and 30%
of its emissions).
Concerning the policy parameters, authorizing permit trading (linking) within
the coalition is not statistically significant. In the two studies that change ex-
plicitly this parameter in the different scenarios (Lanzi et al., 2012; Springmann,
2012), permit trading diminishes leakage to a small extent. It is therefore the
lack of variability between studies that may explain this non-significance (about
half of the articles have permit trading in all their scenarios and the other half
do not in all their scenarios).
Conversely, extending carbon pricing to all GHG sources is statistically sig-
nificant, especially when BCAs are implemented (decreasing the leakage ratio
by 6 percentage points). However the poor variability of this parameter dimin-
ishes the confidence we can grant to this econometric estimation (two articles
study the coverage extension to all GHGs in one of their scenarios, but all the
other articles only consider carbon emissions, i.e. there is no variability between
studies).
The Armington parameter proves statistically significant (except for the
“BCAs” sample) and is positive as expected. A higher value, meaning a more
“flexible” international trade modeled, induces more impact of price differenti-
ation across regions on trade flows, and therefore more leakage. In our meta-
regression model, taking high values of Armington elasticities instead of low
values would then lead to leakage ratio estimates about 2 × 1.9 = 3.8 percent-
age points higher.
With a very high p-value, we find that the BCA parameter is statistically
significant and is negative. All other parameters being constant, BCAs imple-
mentation reduces the leakage ratio by 6 percentage points. This statistical
finding fits the data in the descriptive statistics section (figure 8).
More specifically, among the BCAs options, export rebates and the inclusion
of all sectors instead of only EITE sectors would have the most important impact
(decrease of 4 percentage points of the leakage ratio for each), roughly the
double than basing adjustment on foreign specific emissions instead of home
specific emissions. In this meta-regression model it is not the politically and
juridically risky option (foreign carbon content based adjustment) that would be
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the most efficient to reduce leakage but more an option with high administrative
costs (adjustment to all sectors). The inclusion of indirect emissions is without
surprise not statistically significant (there is very little statistical variability for
this parameter). In the two studies where a change of this feature is included in
the scenarios, it is proven to reduce leakage: in Böhringer et al. (2012c), from
0.5 to 2 percentage points, depending on the adjustment level, and in Monjon
and Quirion (2011a), from 1.5 to 2 percentage points.
Meta-regression results can also be used to make out-of-sample predictions,
which is called benefit transfer (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009; Van Houtven et al.,
2007). This exercise is especially interesting for meta-analysis of empirical stud-
ies as they allow forecast for other locations or commodities which may save the
employed resources to make additional surveys. Here we show as an example the
results of leakage ratio estimations with the meta-regression analysis coefficients
for different abating coalitions and policies (see Table 4). The estimated values
of leakage ratio seem reasonable but the 95% confidence intervals are very wide.
6. Conclusion
A global climate policy is unlikely to be implemented in the years to come
and the adoption of ambitious national or regional climate policies is hindered
by claims of industry competitiveness losses and carbon leakage. Border Car-
bon Adjustment (BCAs) has been proposed to overcome these hurdles but its
potential efficacy has been controversial. Moreover some authors argue that
BCAs aims at protecting heavy industries competitiveness rather than at tack-
ling leakage (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010) while other authors defend that BCAs
implementation cannot be justified only for competitiveness motives (Cosbey
et al., 2012). Finally, BCAs proposals differ by key design choices such as the
inclusion of exports rebates, indirect (electricity-related) emissions, or the ad-
justment level, which can be the domestic or foreign average specific emissions,
or best-available technologies. How BCAs performance would be impacted by
these choices remains an open question.
To shed some light of these issues, we have gathered and analysed 310 es-
timates of carbon leakage and output loss in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed
(EITE) sectors from 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012. A meta-regression was
conducted to capture the impact of different assumptions on the model results.
Across our studies, the leakage ratio ranges from 5% to 25% (mean 14%)
without BCAs and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCAs. BCAs reduce the
leakage ratio with robust statistical significance: all parameters being constant
in the meta-regression analysis, the ratio drops by 6 percentage points with
the implementation of BCAs. In most CGE models, some leakage remains
after BCAs implementation, which is not the case with partial equilibrium (PE)
models. The most likely explanation is that in CGE models, a part of leakage
is due to the international fossil fuel price channel which is unaffected by BCAs,
while most PE models do not feature this leakage channel.
Concerning output loss for EITE industries, results are in sharp contrast
to results about leakage: CGE models predict loss in a range from 0% to 4%
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(mean 2%) without BCAs while PE models foresee more than the double. BCAs
corrects for the output loss in CGE models but less so in sectoral models. The
explanation seems that in PE models, a higher output loss is due to a drop in
demand for CO2-intensive materials, loss which is mitigated by BCAs.
Further, the importance of the coalition size is statistically confirmed and
quantified, as well as the impact of extending pricing to all greenhouse gases.
The latter reduces the leakage ratio, and the smaller the abating coalition, the
bigger the leakage ratio. This meta-analysis also confirms the importance of
Armington elasticities in the leakage ratio estimation, a result crucial in terms of
uncertainty analysis, which calls for more transparency and sensitivity analyses
regarding these parameters in future studies.
The features of BCAs (coverage, level of adjustment, etc.) are of the highest
importance for the WTO compatibility, feasibility, and political acceptability.
The purpose of the meta-regression was also to assess their impact on competi-
tiveness and leakage. In the meta-regression, the inclusion of all sectors and the
presence of export rebates appear to be the two most efficient features to reduce
leakage, followed by the adjustment level based on foreign carbon content. Yet
one can guess, in the case of hypothetical BCAs implementation, that politi-
cal and juridical aspects will be the more determinant and that only a “light”
version (adjustment based on best available technologies, probably without the
inclusion of indirect emissions) is likely to see the light of day.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Sensitivity analysis
Tables 5 and 6 present the different sensitivity analyses. Results including
or excluding outliers are very similar. The noticeable differences are a slightly
higher impact of BCAs for the model including outliers (BCAs diminish the
leakage ratio by 7 percentage points instead of 6 percentage points) and less
significant coefficient concerning the BCAs features.
Results with the OLS cluster-robust estimation and REML estimation are
more diverging. In the OLS cluster-robust model, the impact of extending the
coverage to all greenhouse gases is strongly bigger, the impact of the size of the
coalition is twice less important and the value of the abatement coefficient is
twice more important. Among the BCAs features, the coefficient measuring the
effect of covering all sectors instead of only EITE sectors is also twice larger.
Remarkably, the impact of BCAs on the leakage reduction is the same for the
two models.
7.2. Summary statistics
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Abating coalition Europe Annex 1 without Russia
Target 15% 30% 15% 30%
No BCA (a) 19% [3%;33%] 21% [3%;38%] 12% [-5%;28%] 14% [5%;33%]
BCA light (b) 15% [-5%;34%] 16% [-8%;39%] 10% [-11%;31%] 11% [-13%;36%]
BCA strong (c) 9% [-16%;33%] 10% [-18%;38%] 4% [-22%;30%] 6% [-24%;35%]
(a) Estimation with the “All” model
(b) Estimation with the “BCAs” model. AllSect = 1 only
(c) Estimation with the “BCAs” model. AllSect = 1, Foreign = 1 and
Exp = 1
Table 4: Benefit transfer: leakage ratio estimations by the meta-regression model
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis. Effect of the removal of outliers in the REML estimation
All No BCA BCA
Original† All Sample Original† All Sample Original† All Sample
GE 0.091 0.067 0.047 0.048 0.124 0.113
(2.74)*** (1.58) (1.60) (1.19) (4.27)*** (2.54)**
Coasize -0.214 -0.192 -0.221 -0.256 -0.147 -0.124
(12.12)*** (8.22)*** (10.97)*** (10.32)*** (5.94)*** (4.21)***
Abatement 0.090 0.158 0.163 0.111 0.084 0.203
(1.04) (1.36) (1.78)* (0.93) (0.69) (1.41)
Link 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.013
(0.26) (0.33) (0.48) (0.29) (0.13) (0.78)
GHG -0.029 -0.026 -0.014 -0.010 -0.062 -0.062
(2.24)** (1.45) (1.04) (0.59) (2.82)*** (2.35)**
Armington 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.032 0.003 0.003
(4.68)*** (3.43)*** (7.75)*** (5.85)*** (0.51) (0.40)
BCA -0.063 -0.074
(14.27)*** (12.40)***
Exp -0.039 -0.040
(2.98)*** (2.58)***
Foreign -0.020 -0.020
(1.90)* (1.55)
Allsect -0.042 -0.030
(2.90)*** (1.75)*
Indirect -0.015 -0.019
(0.87) (0.90)
N 294 310 134 140 160 166
Wald χ2 386.13 238.64 192.61 147.17 78.25 42.97
LR test 220.50 216.05 96.95 121.06 42.02 62.14
† Some outliers are removed from the sample
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis. REML versus OLS cluster-robust estimation
All No BCA BCA
REML Cluster-robust REML Cluster-robust REML Cluster-robust
OLS OLS OLS
GE 0.091 0.053 0.047 0.006 0.124 0.103
(2.74)*** (1.60) (1.60) (0.21) (4.27)*** (3.07)***
Coasize -0.214 -0.107 -0.221 -0.067 -0.147 -0.105
(12.12)*** (2.95)** (10.97)*** (1.41) (5.94)*** (2.69)**
Abatement 0.090 0.197 0.163 0.326 0.084 0.165
(1.04) (0.90) (1.78)* (2.22)** (0.69) (1.12)
Link 0.003 0.016 -0.005 0.020 0.002 0.008
(0.26) (0.77) (0.48) (1.23) (0.13) (0.40)
GHG -0.029 -0.083 -0.014 -0.070 -0.062 -0.054
(2.24)** (5.01)*** (1.04) (4.89)*** (2.82)*** (4.51)***
Armington 0.019 0.022 0.033 0.034 0.003 0.006
(4.68)*** (3.36)*** (7.75)*** (4.36)*** (0.51) (1.60)
BCA -0.063 -0.065
(14.27)*** (6.63)***
Exp -0.039 -0.039
(2.98)*** (2.03)*
Foreign -0.020 -0.026
(1.90)* (2.31)**
Allsect -0.042 -0.101
(2.90)*** (4.01)***
Indirect -0.015 0.001
(0.87) (0.08)
N 294 294 134 134 160 160
Wald χ2 386.13 192.61 78.25
LR test 220.50 96.95 42.02
R2 0.38 0.32 0.59
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